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U. S. TRUNK LINES
By ADAM JAWORSKI*
Research Engineer, Air Transport Board; M.Sc. (Eng.) 1931
Lwow; M. Law 1936 (Warsaw, Statistical Course, USAAF, Har-
vard, 1944-45; Dr. (Iur.) 1946 Oxford; Formerly, Lt. Col. Polish
Air Force, England, 1946.
ON this continent Trans-Canada Air Lines is operating the largest
unduplicated route mileage (8,362 miles in 1950); but in rev-
enue ton-miles flown in domestic services, T.C.A. is in seventh place
in the U. S. trunk lines' scale. Therefore, a comparative analysis of
T.C.A. and U. S. trunk line operations is here presented to show how
T.C.A.'s difficult economic task of serving a large network with a low
traffic density affects its financial results.
As a basis for comparison, the U. S. trunk lines are probably the
hardest test for any operator in the world because these trunk lines
with their high standard of service and dynamic growth of operations
are in the front line of civil aviation progress.
The most pertinent factors of traffic and income statistics will be
presented by expressing T.C.A.'s data for the period 1946-1950 as a
percentage of the U. S. trunk lines' total. In all graphs a semilogarith-
mic scale has been used because logarithms - as distinct from ordinary
scales - show the rate of change and not the absolute values of changes.
Progress is better evaluated by the rate of changes rather than by the
absolute values of data, especially when two organizations with a differ-
ent order of magnitude are compared.
TRAFFIC AND REVENUE COMPARISONS
Traffic (Revenue Ton-Miles). It is evident from Table 1 and
Figure 1 that T.C.A. traffic in revenue ton-miles not only increased
during the period 1946-1950, but increased faster than the correspond-
ing figures for the trunk lines, however, the rate of progress diminished
towards the end of the period.
Revenue Ton-Miles Related to Fuel Consumption (Fig. 1). Rev-
enue Ton-Miles per gallon of gasoline consumed, is a more useful
index than the commonly quoted weight load factor, because it reflects
to some extent the fleet's characteristics. If the same revenue ton-
miles are flown between two points by two fleets with equal load fac-
tor, it is obvious that when one fleet uses a larger aircraft its direct
costs will be less.
* The views expressed in the paper are the author's and do not necessarily
represent those of the Air Transport Board.
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For T.C.A., the relationship between the revenue ton-miles and
gasoline consumed is of special importance, because the unit cost of
gasoline in Canada is much higher than in the United States. Fortu-
nately, T.C.A. almost caught up with the trunk lines in regard to this
index in 1948 and 1949, but with fleet replacement in the United States
with larger aircraft the discrepancy to T.C.A.'s disadvantage may occur
again.
T.C.A.'s weight load factor for the period 1947-1950 fluctuated
around 57.4 percent, and that of the trunk lines were rising to that
level. Weight load factor should be considered together with Plane
Mile Capacity and Revenue Ton-Miles per gallon of gasoline con-
sumed. From Fig. 1 it may be seen that the rate of increase in the
plane mile capacity is similar to that of revenue miles flown, but a
slight decrease is noticeable in 1950.
Passenger and Cargo Traffic. Passenger-miles flown by T.C.A.,
in relation to the trunk lines are by a fraction of one percent higher
than the revenue ton-miles, with a slightly smaller rate of increase in
1948-1949 (Fig. 1). The rate of increase of Passenger Revenues, when
compared with passenger traffic was slightly less in 1948 but a bit
higher in 1949.
The revenue ton-miles of T.C.A. cargo, composed of freight, ex-
press and excess baggage, represent less than one-half of the passenger
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traffic. Both these items are related on Figs. 1 and 2 to the correspond-
ing figures of the trunk lines, and both have a relative upward trend.
The cargo revenues on a percentage basis of U. S. trunk carriers
were approximately twice as high as the cargo traffic, and the rate of
increase is also higher, except in 1950. (Fig. 2.) This fact is due
mainly to a faster decrease of revenues from ton-miles of cargo for the
U. S. trunk lines as compared with the T.C.A. data.
Air Mail: Traffic and Revenue. Following the "all-up" mail policy
in Canada, which benefits every user of post services in this country,
the ton-miles of mail traffic show a relatively sharp percentage increase
during 1947-1949, as indicated on Fig. 2 but this increase changes to a
small decrease in 1950.
There is still controversy about the air mail revenue per ton-mile
to U. S. carriers, because the payments for carrying mail have been
used to rectify operating losses of some of the air carriers. However,
1948 1949 1950
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a separate investigation for each carrier is needed; first to establish
the existence of subsidy in payment for carrying mail by him, and
secondly, if mail subsidy is involved, what should be attributed to the
communities with non-economic revenues and where the carrier is not
permitted to abandon the services.
It must be remembered, however, that the present air mail rate
of the largest trunk carriers that are carrying more than three-quarters
of air mail traffic, is only $0.45 per ton-mile, which is roughly twice
the amount paid by the U. S. Post Office to the railways for carrying
mail, thus the ratio is the same as that between the air mail letter
stamp and the ordinary letter stamp. Although present T.C.A. air
mail revenues are still higher than the average of the trunk lines, the
drastic downward trend of changes in relative payments for one ton-
mile of air mail is evident from Fig. 2.
Total Expenses and Total Revenues. The T.C.A. average rate
of increase (related to the progress of U. S. trunk lines) in total rev-
enues, less air mail revenue, is much higher than the total expenses
and total revenues of U. S. trunk carriers, as may be seen from Fig. 3.
This is a very encouraging fact.
to E RERC E N '.
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The unpleasantly higher rate of relative increase in total expenses
versus total revenues is obvious, but the real meaning of total revenues
will be understood only if the mail payments are evaluated with the
actual costs for carrying mail. Until this is done, total revenues less
air mail revenue is a better criterion.
On the other hand, in considering U. S. trunk lines, total expenses,
it should be mentioned that the operating losses in 1946-1948, espe-
cially in 1947, and the capital requirement for equipment, have in-
creased considerably the amount of bank loans, thus imposing an
appreciable burden for serving long term debts.
The downward relative trend of the total revenues in 1946-1948
in spite of almost unchanged percent of revenues excluding air mail'
payment was determined by the sharp drop in the relative revenue
per ton-mile of air mail carried. (Fig. 2.)
The sharp increase in revenues in the United States in 1950 must
be attributed in some degree to the impact of defense preparations.
For example, the revenue from military operations represented 3.4
percent of United Airlines' total revenues and in absolute figures ex-
ceeds the revenues from carrying express traffic during 1950 ($3.6
million versus $3.1 million).
There is a downward trend in 1946-1948 in relative expense per
revenue or available ton-mile, but the trend seems to level out in
1949-1950 with appproximately a 25 percent higher cost per revenue
ton-mile..
TRAFFIC AND DIFFERENT OPERATION INDICES
Traffic Density. In railway statistics, traffic density is reported
in gross or net ton-miles per mile of operated road. It was found in
the United States that for a very light density (approximately 1/3 below
the average) railway operating costs increased considerably but after
obtaining an average level of density, there was not a further decrease
of costs2 )
To some extent there is an analogy in air transportation, as indi-
cated by the T.C.A.'s data in Table 1.
In 1949, T.C.A.'s traffic density was 39.1 percent of the trunk line
average, although in available ton-mile T.C.A.'s figure is as high as
66.8 percent of trunk line average and 70.9 percent of the revenue ton
miles. Therefore, T.C.A.'s low traffic density explains its higher cost
than the trunk lines with the same order of available ton-miles flown.
The importance of traffic density was strongly underlined by Dr.
D. W. Rentzel, Chairman of the C.A.B. (at that time) who stated dur-
ing recent investigation of non-scheduled operations: "We have found
I An analysis of T.C.A.'s particular expenses for the period 1946-1950, has
been submitted by the writer in the May issue of the Journal of the Royal Aero-
nautical Society, 1952.
2K. T. Healy: THE ECONOMICS OP TRANSPORTATION IN AMER-
ICA, p. 168. Published-Ronald Press, New York, 1940.
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TABLE 1
TCA'S AND U.S. TRUNK LINESx) TRAFFIC FACTORS ON THE
NORTH AMERICAN ROUTES (1946-1950)
Year 1946
(1) (2)
1. TRAFFIC(Rev. Ton-Mi. $000,000's)
TCA 16.7
U.S. Trunk Lines 650.0
2. WEIGHT LOAD FACTOR (%)
TCA 70.8
U.S. Trunk Lines 66.2
3. PLANE MILE CAPACITY (TONS)
TCA 1.72
U.S. Trunk Lines 3.22
4. REVENUE TON-MILES PER (U.S.)
GALLON GASOLINE CONSUMED
TCA 2.04









1947 1948 1949 1950
(3) (4) (5) (6)
19.6 28.2 35.8 44.3
683.4 703.1 808.9 964.1
58.0 57.8 56.5 57.2
57.0 52.0 53.2 57.2
2.17 3.19 3.87 4.15
3.85 4.28 4.66 5.09
2.03 2.20 2.27 2.37







6. AVERAGE PASSENGER TRIP (MILES)
TCA 510 420
U.S. Trunk Lines 497 490
7. AVERAGE SPEED MPH
TCA 177 168,
U.S. Trunk Lines 169 170
8. TRAFFIC DENSITY
(Rev. Ton-Mi./Route Mi. Op.)
TCA 2,658 2,522
U.S. Trunk Lines 13,500 13,360
9. REV. TON-MILES PER DOLLAR SPENT
ON WAGES SALARIES
TCA (R.T.M./Can. $) 1.95 2.25
U.S. Trunk Lines
(R.T.M./U.S. $) 3.86 3.49



























it 'true in air transportation that the two most important factors in
costs are density of traffic and length of haul." 3
According to the BEA experience with Viking aircraft, on the
London-Paris route, (215 miles) the doubling of traffic density will
bring down the total operating cost per available ton-mile by 20 per-
cent. Similar increase in utilization or stage length will decrease
total cost by 19 or 19.8 percent respectively. (The last figure indicates
that the 215 mile stage length for the Viking is too short, as it prob-
ably is for any existing aircraft of the 27 passenger class) . But it is
underlined by P. G. Masefield who presented these figures, that the
greatest saving in total costs per available ton-mile (approximately 23
3 American Aviation Daily, April 25, 1951, page 350.
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percent) will be obtained by substituting for the Viking the more
modern "Ambassador" 4).
Traffic density, in turn is determined by several factors, from which
the route characteristics is the most important (see C.A.A. traffic study
quoted below). Professor H. K. Koontz in an excellent analysis of the
trunk lines, stated that the poor route characteristics, e.g. between
small towns, and not the size of the company or the over-competition
on particular routes, have been chiefly responsible for the deficit of
the not-successful trunk lines.5
However, the proposed remedy; consolidation of the present 16
trunk lines into four larger groups will not improve the poor routes'
characteristics if the present flight frequencies are unchanged. It will
only rob Peter to pay Paul. The saving in overhead by merging into
larger units will be negligible because according to Professor Koontz's
analysis the- size of the company is not significant in the unit costs.
Surely, the elimination of duplicating services of some of the air-
lines will represent a considerable saving, but this was already in the
study by F. W. Gill and G. L. Bates who pointed out the appreciable
losses inflicted by the over-competition.
Average Passenger Trip and Average Speed. A slight downward
trend in average length of passenger trip between 1946-1950 is shown
both by the trunk lines and T.C.A., so that the relative position of
T.C.A. was practically unchanged with its passenger trip approxi-
mately 2.5 percent longer as compared with the trunk lines average
(Tables 1 and 2). The C.A.A.'s basic formula for the traffic between
two cities shows that it is roughly proportionate to the product of the
populations of these two communities divided by the distance between
them, assuming economic character and area density held constant.
Therefore, T.C.A.'s relative increase of traffic may indicate that for
the T.C.A. Domestic system the ratio of population of connected places
and corresponding distances may grow faster than for the trunk lines.
The trend of T.C.A.'s relative average speed between 1946-1950
is slightly downward (Table 1), although there is a significant upward
trend in absolute figures.
Revenues to Gross Property. The ratio of total revenue to the
combined value of fleet and ground equipment, could be defined as
the index of capital utilization. As the same property is used by
T.C.A. and some of the trunk line carriers for overseas operations, by
4 P. G. Masefield: SOME ECONOMIC FACTORS IN AIR TRANSPORT
OPERATION, Brancker Memorial Lecture, The Journal of the Institute of
Transport, London, March, 1951, page 98, Figs. 12 & 17.
5 Koontz, H. D., Economical Managerial Factors Underlying Subsidy Needs
of Domestic Trunk Line Carriers, 18 Journal of Air Law and Commerce (1951).
6 In addition to these two qualitive factors, there are some others not sus-
ceptible to mathematical measurement like; direct verus indirect connections,
number of schedules, time of schedules, service standards, etc. Some very in-
teresting statistical data on these points are given by the C.A.A. publication-
EFFECTIVE COMMUNITY AIR TRAFFIC POTENTIAL - Washington,,
D. C., July, 1950.
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TABLE 2
TCA's AND U.S. TRUNK LINES,) OPERATING REVENUES AND
EXPENSES FACTORS ON THE NORTH AMERICAN ROUTES (1946-1950)
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0.752 0.782 0.740 0.740 0.719













0.571 0.628 0.626 0.652 0.597







1.31 1.40 1.67 2.01 2.25
1.74 1.80 1.85 2.12 2.23
1) Caribbean and Hawaiian Airlines not included.
a) Property and Equipment without deductions for depreciation for the period
1946-1948 and Net Property & Equipment for the period 1948-1950, therefore the
periods are not comparable.
b) Purchase of the North Star Equipment for $12.9 mill.
NOTE: There may be a difference between Total Revenue and the sum of
revenues from passenger, cargo and mail, because the total revenues include also
non-scheduled revenues and these figures are rounded.
SOURCE: As in Table I and for the national income in Canada and the United
States:
National Accounts, Income and Expenditure, Preliminary 1950,
Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Ottawa.Survey of Current Business, July, 1950 and February, 1951.
U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Washington, D. C.
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considering this index, it is necessary to include the whole system
(domestic and overseas).
For T.C.A. this index is increasing in absolute values and relatively
to the U. S. trunk lines as may be seen from Table 2, disregarding the
low level in 1947 owing to the purchase of North Stars for $12.9
millions.
Only the net bookwalue of the property and equipment was avail-
able for the trunk lines for 1949 and 1950.
Revenue Ton-Mile related to Wages and Salary. In 1948 T.C.A.
reached 106.7 i.e., 3.25 x 100 -- 3.35 x 0.909, percent of trunk lines
output in revenue ton-mile per U. S. dollar spent on salaries and
wages, (for the period 1946-1950, it was assumed Canada $ = 0.909
U. S. $). This index is probably a better indication of organization
efficiency than the relation to number of employees which disregards
the expense for that purpose.
The rate of progress of this factor is the most striking of all factors
of traffic and income previously discussed. However, no data are
available for the trunk lines for the 1949-1950 period.
Total Revenue related to the National Income. No single index
or series of numerical factors can define adequately the position of any
of the transportation modes in the national economy, especially if
such means have been in operation only during the last thirty years.
It may be said that transport in the economy has more imponderabilia
than any other industry. The total transportation revenues do not
show how the pattern of many industries was decided by transportation
activities.
With these reservations, a single index was chosen to make possi-
ble at least a very general appraisal of the relative position in the
national economy of T.C.A. and the trunk lines. The index of total
revenues of the carriers to the national income, seems to be suitable
for this purpose. The upward trend of this index during the period
1946-1950 is evident for T.C.A. and the trunk lines. (Fig. 3.) In
1950 T.C.A. had improved its relative position in the national econ-
omy by 72 percent as compared with 1946. The corresponding figure
for the trunk lines is 28 percent. T.C.A. Domestic Services in 1950
had a better relative position in the national economy than the trunk
lines. In 1946 the reverse was true.
TREND IN RELATION OF REVENUES FROM DIFFERENT TRAFFIC
AND COST CONSIDERATION
When the revenues from passengers, cargo (express, freight, excess
baggage) and air mail, are taken on a weight and distance basis, i.e.,
per ton-mile, a relationship is obtained which is far removed from
a cost ratio, even when this latter ratio could be only roughly estimated.
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Taking in each case the revenues from a ton-mile of cargo as 100,
we see the following trend:
REVENUE PER TON MILE FROM CARGO COMPARED WITH THAT
FROM PASSENGER AND MAIL7
Cargo Revenue per Ton-Mile = 100
Year 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950
T. C. A. Passenger 71 85 96 101 126
Mail 419 428 319 252 287
Trunk Lines Passenger 131 167 229 241 217
Mail 152 224 321 549 452
United Air Lines Passenger 151 179 262 282 260
Mail 145 161 412 296 269
The upward trend of T.C.A.'s ratio of passenger revenue versus cargo
revenue on weight basis, in 1950, is nearly in the same plae as the
corresponding ratio of the trunk lines was in 1946, but the mail-cargo
ratio is nearly equal to that of United Air Lines, which may be con-
sidered as the forerunner in trends for the trunk lines. (But with the
new mail rate of $0.45/ton-mile for the Big Four, the mail-cargo
ratio for the United Air Lines will decrease probably up to 175).
Equal revenue for one ton of passenger and mail seems to be a
goal for T.C.A. and for U. S. trunk lines. For T.C.A. the trends indi-
cate that this may be reached in 1952, close to a ratio of 140, which
seems to be rather low. This could be improved by slowing the rate
of decrease of the mail-cargo ratio and speeding up the passenger-
cargo revenue per ton-mile relationship. If the railway revenue ratio
on ton-mile basis for passenger-mail-cargo-revenue is as 5:3:1, the
airlines, after reaching in a few years, the United Air Lines position
of 1950, i.e., the ratio 3:3:1, will drive to the next step, probably
3.5:3:1. (It may be recalled that the Ernst .& Ernst report on mail-pay-
subsidy, based compensatory mail rate on the first class passenger fare
structure and treated cargo as a fill-in service)
However, it must be remembered that space requirement (cubic
feet) for unit weight is 5.3 higher for passengers than for cargo or
mail"). Besides the value per pound and loading density, there are
7 Cargo revenue of the United Air Lines was compiled from the United Air
Lines Annual Report-1950, as a weighted average from express and freight
revenue. In 1950, revenue per ton-mile was $0.58 for passenger, $0.60 for mail,$0.34 for express, $0.19 for freight, with a weighted average of $0.22 for cargo(express and freight).
8 Passenger space requirement of the B.O.A.C. "Argonaut" (built in Can-
ada) is 0.42 cu. ft./lb. of passenger weight, and space requirement (i.e., recipro-
cal of the loading density) for cargo according to the S.B.A.C. formula is)
.079 cu. ft./lb. of cargo. In the A.T.A. recommendation this is increased to
1.1 cu. ft./lb. of cargo or baggage. On freighter aircraft like Bristol Freighter
of Fairchild Packet, the cargo space requirement is much higher than S.A.B.C.
or A.T.A. standards, owing to the galley allowances.
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other factors which have a decisive influence on transportation of a
particular commodity by air.9
No wonder that on the railways, where more experience has been
accumulated in accounting and where passengers have more room,
"figuratively speaking - the average railroad express rate makes it
five times as cheap to ship one-self rail express as to buy a Pullman
ticket."10
Passenger transportation on the railways is only a small fraction
of goods carried, (the opposite is true for the air carriers) , and mostly
passenger fares are below fully allocated expenses, but in many in-
stances passenger revenues are above the out-of-pocket cost, thus con-
tributing to the overheads. However, cost allocation to passenger trains
- likened to the air mail - is a very arbitrary procedure, because most
costs are common to all services.
The aircraft power requirements for a given speed and gross-
weight are, broadly speaking, directly proportional to the frontal area.
One pound of passenger weight requires 5.32/3 = 3.04 times more
engine power than one pound of air cargo. If so, by dividing by 3.04
all power expenses (fuel, oil, engine labor, material and depreciation)
and deducting the Passenger Service Account, the reduction in total
expense of the T.C.A. Domestic system in 1949 would be as high as
22 percent, if instead of passengers an equal amount of ton-mile of
cargo had been flown, this figure may be considered as a minimum
because no saving is accounted for in respect of sales expenses, up-
keeping of cabin equipment, and flight insurance, which expenses are
certainly higher for passenger transportation than for cargo. (Only
air-express includes pick-up and delivery cost, which is not borne by
the airlines in the case of passenger movement.)
This theoretical estimate of at least 22 percent lower cargo trans-
portation cost than passenger is supported by British European Air-
ways' experience, which shows that the total operating cost per ca-
pacity ton-mile for the "Passenger" Dakota (42.8d/C.T.M.) is 26.2
percent higher than for the "Freighter" Dakota (33.6d/C.T.M.) on
the same stage lengths. (Average stage length 166 miles and yearly
utilization 1,750 hours.) The variable costs (cruising plus landing
cost) for the "Passenger" Dakota are 33.6 percent greater than for the
Freighter. By increasing the utilization to 3000 hr. per year, the dif-
ference in total cost per available ton-mile between "Passenger" and
"Freighter" version of the Dakota is increased to 28 percent.1 For a
9 C.A.A. Report: DOMESTIC AIR CARGO, Washington, D. C. 1948, analy-
ses for such factors as: 1) Concentration of source of supply, 2) Distance to
market, 3) Ability to absorb transportation charges (measured by the differ-
ence between wholesale price of the product and the cost of wages or materials
for producing it), 4) Perishability or seasonability. A fifth factor may be added:
susceptibility to pilferage (see Air Transportation, April, 1951, p. 10).
lo T. Wolfe: AIR TRANSPORTATION, p. 478, McGraw-Hill, New York,1950.11 The information regarding Dakota Passenger and Freighter was kindly
given by P. G. Masefield, Chief Executive of B.E.A., in a letter of April 16, 1951.
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larger aircraft this difference will be still higher,12 especially if the
aircraft was originally built for cargo transportation. Present ground-
costs of cargo handling are undoubtedly high, but passenger handling
in the impressive offices maintained by some of the airlines is unlikely
to be less expensive..
CONCLUSION
All things considered, it is a reasonable deduction that T.C.A.'s
rate of progress as related to the trunk lines' operations has had an
upward trend, during the period of 1946-1950; such an achievement
speaks for itself. But speeding up the replacement of fleets by the
trunk lines with an aircraft of a higher working capacity that may
double the present total available seat-miles, will make the relative
progress for T.C.A. more difficult in the future than it has been in
the past.
The impact of defense preparations on the 1951 air traffic increase
cannot be assessed at present, but it seems probable that it will slow
down in 1952, thus the rate of progress will be closer to the 1946-1950
trend lines than to the spectacular results of 1951.
12 The total cost per mile in 1949 of the C-54 (cargo) operated by Flying
Tiger was $1.16 against $1.56 (average from 13 trunk lines) for the DC-4 (pas-
senger). Thus DC-4 passenger is approximately (as the depreciation methods
may differ) % higher in total operating cost per mile than its cargo version.
It is obvious that per ton-mile the difference will be still higher. (Compiled from
the data in K. E. Kast's paper: "The Air Carrier's Problem" Air Transportation,
May, 1951.
